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Abstract: 
 
Various international organizations have documented the existence of corruption and 
similar practices in many different areas of the health care sector. Empirical studies 
show that in many poor countries over 80 percent of the population has experienced 
corrupt practices in the health sector. In rich countries corruption takes other forms 
such as overbilling and bribes when contracts to build hospitals are signed. The 
question addressed in this paper is if corruption also has a negative impact on 
population health.  In the theoretical section we argue that the causal link between low 
levels of Quality of Government (QoG) and population health can be either direct or 
indirect. The former takes place when, for example, low QoG causes high levels of 
illegitimate absenteeism among health workers or demands for direct payment of 
bribes for adequate treatment. The latter (indirect) causal link is when low QoG leads 
to poverty, low social capital, and low levels of life satisfaction - all leading to 
difficulties in handling various life challenges which in turn causes health problems. 
Our central question is policy related. If you want to improve population health, is it 
better to simply increase spending on health care (and if so, should this be public or 
private money), or is it better to improve the overall quality of the countries’ 
government institutions? Using cross section data from more than 120 countries, our 
findings in the bivariate analyses are that more of a QoG variable is positively 
associated with higher levels of Life Expectancy, lower levels of Mortality Rates for 
Children and Mothers, higher levels of Healthy Life Expectancies and higher levels of 
Subjective Health feelings. In contrast to the strong relationships between the QoG 
variables and the Health indicators, the relationships between the health spending 
measures and population Health are rather weak most of the time and occasionally 
non-existent. Moreover, for Private Health Spending as well as for Private Share of 
Total Health Spending, the relation to good Health is close to zero or slightly 
negative. The policy recommendation coming out of our study to improve Health 
levels around the world, in rich countries as well as in poor countries, is to improve 
the Quality of Government and to finance health care with public, not private, money. 
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Corruption in the Health Sector 
 
 
The minute after she had given birth to her first child at one of the public hospitals in the city 
of Bangalore in India, Nesam Velankanni wanted the midwife to put the crying baby on her 
chest. However, before even getting a glimpse of her newborn baby, a nurse whisked the 
infant away and an attendant asked for a bribe. Nasam Velankanni was told that the 
customary price if she wanted to hold her child directly after giving birth was 12 USD for a 
boy and 7 USD if it was a girl. The attendant told her that she wanted the money immediately 
because the doctors were leaving for the day and wanted their share before going home.  For 
Nasam Velankanni and her family, 12 US dollars was a substantial amount of money since 
her husband was working for less than one dollar a day. Eventually, the poor woman’s 
mother-in-law solved the problem by promising to pawn a set of gold earrings and so Nasam 
Velankanni got to hold her newborn baby. Even if the government of India have established 
fierce measures to combat such forms of petty corruption and extortion in the health sector, 
the custom remains partly because many poor people are afraid that their babies will receive 
bad treatment from angry health care workers if they do not pay (Dugger 2005).  
 
This story, told in The New York Times on August 30th, 2005, is but one of innumerable 
descriptions of corruption and similar forms of dysfunctional government practices that exist 
in many countries in the health care sector. Survey data about perceptions of corruption from 
23 developing countries shows that corruption in the health care sector is ranked as number 
one among nine sectors in three countries1, as number two in three other countries2 and within 
the top four most corrupt sectors in another four countries3. In many of these countries, over 
80 percent of the population has experienced corrupt practices in the health sector. Another 
survey study from former communist countries in Eastern Europe has shown that in most of 
these countries, well over 50 percent of the population thinks that corruption among doctors is 
widespread (Lewis 2006). In Hungary the practice is to leave an envelope at the doctor’s desk 
with a sum that for an ordinary Hungarian family is quite substantial (Kornai 2000). Another 
example is the very high level of absenteeism among health personnel in many national health 
care systems in developing countries. For various reasons (low pay, bad control, low sense of 
public duties, greed), health care workers in developing countries simply do not show up at 
                                                 
1 Moldova, Slovakia and Tajikistan. 
2 Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. 
3 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar and Morocco. 
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work. Instead, they decide to earn extra money by working “on the side” (Lewis and Lloyd-
Sherlock 2009; Widmalm 2008). Moreover, Eslava-Schmalback et al. show that inequity in 
health is higher in countries with more corruption (Eslava-Schmalbach et al. 2008, p. 146). 
 
 
Dying of Corruption 
 
In 2006, the well-known international anti-corruption organization Transparency 
International published a special report about the devastating effects that corruption have on 
people’s access to health care and on health in general. The report documents the existence of 
corruption and similar practices in many different areas of the health care sector such as the 
administration of hospitals, “under the table” payments to doctors in many Eastern European 
countries, the existence of counterfeit drugs in Nicaragua  and overbilling to insurance 
companies in the United States. The report indicates that while the type of corruption 
illustrated by the “Bangalore case” above is unusual in the OECD countries, other forms of 
corrupt practices in the health care sector plague many developed countries.  Recently, The 
New York Review of Books, one of the world’s most influential literary magazines, published 
a lengthy article (and a following “exchange”) titled “Drug Companies and Doctors: A Story 
of Corruption” in which the author Marcia Angell claims that medical doctors in the U.S. are 
evaluating the effects of new drugs manufactured by companies in which they also have an 
economic interest.  One interesting part of this “exchange” is that the author of the article 
does not equate corruption with criminal behaviour. Instead, she argues that corruption should 
be understood as “undermining the impartiality that is essential both to medical research and 
clinical practices”. As Marcia Angell argues, “judges do not hear cases in which they have a 
financial interest. Reporters do not write stories about companies in which they have a 
financial interest. By the same token, doctors should not have a financial interest in treatments 
they are evaluating” (Angell 2009). With this definition of corruption, Angell is in line with 
the former World Bank economist Daniel Kaufmann, who introduced the concept of “legal 
corruption” by which he means activities by agents to “collude and purchase, or unduly 
influence the rules of the game, shape the institutions, the policies and regulations and the 
laws for their own private benefits”.4 According to Kaufmann, legal corruption is closely 
connected to activities that undermine collective action (Kaufmann and Vicente 2005). The 
                                                 
4 http://info.worldbank.org/etools/bspan/PresentationView.asp?PID=2363&EID=1056 
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concept of “legal corruption” is especially important in the health care sector since instances 
when for example hospitals, insurers or pharmaceutical companies act dishonestly to enrich 
themselves instead of putting the patients medical needs as their first priority, they may not be 
doing anything that is formally illegal. But as Savedoff and Hussman have argued, “they are 
abusing the public’s trust in the sense that people and organisations engaged in health care 
delivery are held to a higher standard in the interest of protection people’s health” (Savedoff 
and Hussmann 2006). Since the medical profession usually is given a large degree of 
discretion, they are assumed to act in the best interests of their patients.  
 
 
Studying the Relationship Between the Quality of Government and Good Health 
 
Corruption has a significant negative impact on population health. Gupta et al (2000) have 
demonstrated that corruption indicators are negatively associated with for instance child and 
maternal mortality. The purpose of this study is to try to give a preliminary overview of the 
relation between variables that measure what has been conceptualized as “Quality of 
Government” (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) and a number of standard measures of population 
health in the light of how much and what type of (private or public) money is spent on health 
care in different countries (Bloom and Canning 2000). In addition to whatever academic 
interests our study will have, we argue that analyses like this one may have something 
important to say to policy makers in both the health care and development sector. Simply put, 
if you want to improve population health (measured as infant mortality and expected life time 
at birth), what works? More precisely, is it better to simply increase spending on health care 
(and if so, should this be public or private money), or is it better to improve the overall quality 
of the countries government institutions?  
 
It should be added that indicators of population health such as the ones we use here, can be 
interpreted as telling us more about a society than just how healthy its population is. As 
argued by Hall and Lamont, there are good arguments for taking population health as a 
measure of how successful different societies are. Based on the idea of “capabilities” 
launched by Amartya Sen, and criticizing various strands of “post-enlightenment thought for 
leading to a balkanization within (and between) the social science disciplines, they argue that 
all else being equal, health enhances people capabilities “to pursue their the goals important to 
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their lives, whether through individual or collective action” and that this is what defines a 
successful society (Hall and Lamont 2009, p. 2).   
 
The empirical case studies and illustrations noted above are important for increasing our 
knowledge about the great variety of corrupt practices that can take place in the health care 
sector. They are also very valuable for laying bare the “micro-level” logic in these practices 
and give insights into how the agents’ behaviour can be understood. However, like all case 
studies, they can be questioned because of the difficulty to generalize from the data. One 
reason for why many health economists have refrained from studying the impact of corruption 
on the performance of the health sector in their countries has been the lack of intra-country 
comparable data.  However, by using available measures of indicators on the quality of 
government institutions in a large number of countries, a small group of scholars have started 
to analyze this problem at a more generalizable level. The general finding, which we will refer 
to below, is that the “quality of government factor” is statistically positively related to 
standard measures of population health such as infant mortality and life expectancy from 
birth. Moreover, in some studies it has been shown to be more important than the level of 
public spending on health care.  Before summarizing this literature, we want to make a few 
arguments for why the health care sector may be especially prone to problems of corruption 
and similar forms of dysfunctional government practices. 
 
 
Ways of Causality 
 
In development economics, the earlier focus on market liberalization as the primary mean for 
economic growth (a.k.a. the Washington Consensus) has to a large extent been replaced by a 
new theory that puts forward the importance of the quality of government institutions 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2008; Kaufmann and Kraay 2002; Rodrik 2007; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). This shift is prominent also in political science where 
proponents of the importance of democratization for development have started to shift their 
focus to variables that are closely connected to the performance on the “output” side of the 
political system (Diamond 2008a; Diamond 2008b; Paris 2004; Popov and Dinello 2007). 
Among the problems that can hinder the development of high quality government institutions 
are of course corruption (in its many forms) but also clientelism, patronage and other forms of 
discrimination. While high quality government institutions can have various institutional 
 7
forms, their basic social norm has been defined as “impartiality“ in the exercise of public 
power  (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).   
   
There are several reasons for why population health should be related to the quality of 
government (henceforth QoG). The indirect links are that since a country’s QoG is positively 
related to economic performance, high QoG should result in more economic growth which 
should imply better food, better housing, access to safe water and sanitation,  less strenuous 
working conditions, fewer people living under destitute conditions, and so forth (Bloom and 
Canning 2000). However, the link between a country’s economic prosperity and population 
health is by no means clear cut. The “wealthier is healthier” proposition has difficulties 
handling the fact that there is great variation in for example infant mortality and life 
expectancy between equally poor and (albeit to a lesser extent) equally rich countries (Evans 
2009).     
 
The magnitude of how an institutional factor like QoG indirectly has an effect on population 
health can be illustrated by the following example. According to a conservative estimation by 
the World Health Organization, 1.3 billion people lack access to sufficient quantities of safe 
water, and nearly 3 billion people are without adequate sanitation. Consequently, 80 percent 
of all illnesses in the developing world are the result of waterborne diseases. A conservative 
estimation is that 10,000 people die every day from water and sanitation related illnesses 
(Anbarci, Escaleras, and Register 2009; Stockholm International Water Institute 2006).  This 
problem is by an increasing number of experts in the area no longer seen as an engineering 
problem that can be solved by more investment in technical equipment. It is not a lack of 
technical solutions (dams, sewages, water cleaning stations, etc.) or natural supply of clean 
water that is the main problem. Instead, the problem lies in dysfunctional administrative 
institutions. More precisely, the problem is seen as caused by a lack of adequate institutions 
for maintenance, pricing and distribution of rights to land and water (Bruns and Meinzen-
Dick 2000; Transparency International. 2008). Cross-comparable empirical assessments of 
how different institutional frameworks perform comparatively in providing safe water are 
however in short supply and more research is widely asked for (Bayliss 2003; Bruns and 
Meinzen-Dick 2000).  
 
Other such indirect causal chains could be that QoG is positively related to social capital (a 
combination of extended social networks and generalized trust) which in turn has been shown 
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to have a positive impact on health (Lindstrom and Mohseni 2009; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; 
Schultz, O'Brien, and Tadesse 2008).  Hall and Taylor argue that not being able to cope with 
various life challenges often leads to emotional as well as physiological health problems. 
Lacking networks and relations based on mutual trust is one important factor why people lack 
capabilities to handle various challenges (Hall and Taylor 2009). Using an experimental 
approach, Rothstein and Eek (2009) have shown that experiencing corruption in public 
authorities does not only diminish people’s trust in these authorities, but also their trust in 
“people in general”. Thus, one can argue for a causal chain that goes from corruption to low 
trust/low social capital to health problems (Hall and Taylor 2009). Moreover, based on data 
from the World Value Survey and WHO, Helliwell and Huang (2008) have shown that living 
under corrupt, unreliable and untrustworthy government institutions is a very important 
explanation for low subjective well-being (a.k.a unhappiness), especially in poorer countries,  
controlling for a number of other variables such as divorce rate, income/capita and religiosity. 
Since low life satisfaction is causally related to health problems, there could thus also be a 
causal chain running from corruption to unhappiness to low population health.   
 
High levels of QoG should also make people more willing to pay taxes since they would have 
more confidence in how well their tax money will be used by various government agencies 
(Scholz and Lubell 1998).  Since there is a positive correlation between public spending on 
health care and the standard measures of population health, high QoG should result in more 
public spending on health care and thus better population health.  
 
Furthermore, as shown by research in social epidemiology, there seems to exist a strong 
causal link between social and economic inequality on the one hand and low levels of 
population health on the other hand. For example, Wilkinson and Picket show that this 
relation between equality and well-being exist both when they compare Western OECD 
countries and when they compare the fifty states in the U.S. What is striking about their 
findings is that mental illness, physical health problems and shorter life expectancy is not only 
hitting poor people in unequal societies. Instead, the show for example that “ across whole 
populations, mental illness is five times higher in the most unequal compared to the least 
unequal societies” (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009. p 181). The same goes for problems like 
obesity, life expectancy and various forms of physical illnesses. As they point out, the Nordic 
countries together with Japan are the ones that are doing best in their sample. This shows that 
low levels of inequality (and the following higher level of population health) can be reached 
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without an encompassing high-spending welfare state (Japan). However, as they also point 
out, most of the countries that have high levels of population health are countries with 
encompassing welfare states (the Nordic countries). Thus, there may be another indirect 
causal link between QoG and population health because in countries with low QoG, people 
will not entrust the government with enough money (taxes) and without economic resources, 
there will be a shortage of social policies that ameliorate high levels inequality which, 
according to this type of research, is a major causal factor behind low population health 
(Marmot 2004; Siegrist and Marmot 2006; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).  
 
As indicated by the empirical illustrations mentioned above, one could also hypothesize a 
number of more direct causal mechanisms between QoG and population health. The health 
care sector produces a type of service in which what economists call “problems of asymmetric 
information” are common. The source of the funding for medical treatment, be it the patient 
herself, a government agency or a private insurance agency, cannot have anything close to 
“perfect information” if the treatment the doctor(s) suggests is motivated by medical reasons 
or by an interest for personal enrichment. Moreover, when there is a “third party” that pays, 
something that is common in most developed countries, patient and doctor can collaborate to 
use treatments that cost more than what is medically motivated. The health care sector is 
special since the provider of the service usually determines what the “customers” should buy 
(Savedoff and Hussmann 2006). The consequence of these information problems is that the 
health care service is a classic case for “market failures” implying that governments usually 
have to be involved in order to avoid massive inefficiency (Barr 2004).  This implies that the 
production of an efficient health care sector often involves a complex mix of public, semi-
private and private providers as well as regulatory agencies. Taken together, the problems of 
the economic magnitude of the health care sector in many countries, the complex mix of 
actors and the information problems may make this sector especially prone to corruption 
(legal or illegal) as well as other forms of low QoG.    
 
 
 
State of the Art 
 
Surprisingly, there are only a handful of studies in the health and governance literature that 
systematically have analyzed the relation between health, health care and QoG.  
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Employing data from 91 countries, Rajkumar and Swaroop analyzes the impact of public 
health spending on child mortality by modelling the interaction between public spending and 
QoG variables such as “quality of bureaucracy” and “control of corruption”. Controlling for a 
number of other variables, such as income inequality and ethno-linguistic division, they 
conclude that QoG is central in determining the effectiveness of public spending on health 
care. The empirical analysis reveals that a one percentage point increase in the share of public 
health spending of GDP lowers the child mortality rate by 0.32 % in countries with high QoG, 
0.20 % in countries with average QoG and has no effect in countries with low QoG.  
(Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008) 
  
One of the few meta-analyses of the relation between QoG and health has been carried out by 
Maureen Lewis for the Center for Global Development. The main finding is that “good 
governance” is a critical factor in making national health care systems work and that public 
spending on health care is inefficient in countries with low QoG. Unless governments shift 
their attention to the institutional factors that affect performance in the health sector, it is 
doubtful that mortality rates will decline (Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 2009). Wagstaff and 
Claeson (2004) have shown that an increase in the levels of public health funding in countries 
that have received a medium or low CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) that 
measures the quality of policies and institutions) score by the World Bank would not by itself 
necessarily lead to a reduction in child mortality. Conversely, they demonstrate that in 
countries with high levels of QoG, an increase in government health budgets would reduce 
mortality rates for children and mothers based on the assumption that the additional funding is 
distributed to programs and institutions according to the same ratio as current allocations. A 
similar result is reached by a study with data from 118 developing countries (Baldacci et al. 
2008). Regarding the specific question of HIV, an analysis of 149 countries shows that the 
prevalence of HIV is significantly related to low QoG (Menon-Johansson 2005). Lastly, in a 
recent study, Klomp and de Haan have undertaken the most advanced study that we have 
found so far in this area in terms of data and methods. The authors criticise the above 
mentioned type of studies for only taking a few control variables into account and that their 
conclusions about the positive effect of QoG on population health therefore are in doubt. 
They furthermore argue that the relationship between governance and the (quality of) the 
health care sector is arguably a key variable in explaining differences in health outcome 
across countries. In addition to a wealth of data from 101 countries for measuring QoG, 
Klomp and de Haan use sixteen indicators for measuring health. In addition to the standard 
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indicators mentioned above, they add for instance the prevalence of a number of diseases such 
as HIV, Polio and Tuberculosis. Moreover, they measure the standard of the health care sector 
by using ten indicators such as, for example, number of health care personnel per 1,000 
inhabitants and immunization rates for four different illnesses (Hepatitis, Diphtheria, Measles 
and Tuberculosis).  
 
Klomp and de Haan’s main finding is that governance influences health through its indirect 
positive effects on the standard of the health care sector and on income. A 1 % increase in 
governance leads to an increase of 0.55 % in the quality of the health sector and 3.54 % in the 
health of individuals. Moreover, the study shows that it is through the indirect positive effects 
on income that governance can contribute most to an improvement in health. However, the 
authors also argue that the significance of these indirect effects varies between country 
groups. For countries with a relatively healthy population, QoG will have a positive indirect 
effect through the quality of the health care sector, but not via income. On the other hand, for 
countries with a poor population health, the case will be the opposite; QoG will have a 
positive indirect effect through income, but not via the quality of the health care sector 
(Klomp and de Haan 2008). Lazarova and Mosca (2008) have a similar argument when they 
make the case that absolute income is what matters the most in terms of improving health 
indicators in countries below a certain threshold (5,000 PPP international dollars per capita), 
whereas in the countries above this threshold it is QoG that is the most important determinant 
of health.  
 
 
One conclusion from this study is that the influence from QoG on the standard of the health 
sector may be explained that it is only in countries with a relatively high level of general QoG 
that people are willing to pay the taxes at the level needed to have a high standard in the 
health care sector. However, the causality may also run in the opposite direction. In countries 
where people perceive that the quality of the health care sector is low (for example because 
they experience various forms of corruption by the health care staff), they will not be willing 
to pay taxes at the level needed to increase the general QoG (Rothstein and Eek 2009). 
Another conclusion is that the small amount of research in this area and the variation in the 
results point to the need for more research. 
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Charting Basic Relationships 
 
As a first take on the relation between QoG and population health, we felt an urgent need to 
simply chart the basic relationships between a number of well-known Quality of Government 
variables and some standard measures of population health. Our data is from the Quality of 
Government open source dataset (Teorell, Holmberg, and Rothstein 2008). Aided by some of 
the meta-analyses cited above, we decided to employ three QoG variables and five indicators 
of health. Since money always matters, we also concluded that we could not avoid including 
some spending variables. Hence, four measures of health spending were incorporated as well. 
A pivotal question is to what extent quality of government matters besides, or on top of, 
health spending. A related but largely overlooked question in the literature is whether public 
or private health spending is best at creating good health? And if one type of health spending 
is better than the other, does the same still hold in combination with good government? 
 
Our three chosen QoG variables are the World Bank’s Rule of Law indicator, the World 
Bank’s Government Effectiveness measure and Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index. In theory they measure different things, but in practice all three of them are 
highly inter-related with correlation coefficients of around .93. However, for informational 
purposes we include all three in our investigation. 
 
Four of our five health variables are also highly internally correlated across our sample of 
some 180 countries. The internal correlations vary between .85 and .97. The four variables are 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Mortality Rate for Children under Five, Maternal Mortality Rate 
and Healthy Life Expectancy – all taken from WHO. Our fifth health variable is less 
correlated with the other four (around .10). It is a Subjective Health measure taken from the 
World Value Survey and it is only available for around 45 countries in the Quality of 
Government Institute data bank. The money variables measure Total Health Spending (% of 
GDP), Government Spending on Health (% of GDP), Private Spending on Health (% of GDP) 
and Private Share of Total Health Spending (%). All spending measures have been put 
together by WHO.  
 
In the Figure Appendix, that is fully published on the QoG Institute’s web page, 35 bivariate 
scatter plots with regression lines are presented for all of our five health variables and they 
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have been run against the three QoG variables and the four health spending measures.5 
Browsing through all these very informative scatter plots gives an excellent overview of the 
bivariate relationships around the world between, on the one hand, health spending and good 
government and, on the other, good health. Five of these instructive plots can be found at the 
end of this article. 
 
Added to this, we have also included 24 additional scatter plots that demonstrate the 
connections between two health indicators (Healthy Life Expectancy and Mortality Rate for 
Children under Five) and three measures of Health Spending and three QoG variables in 
OECD countries as well as Non-OECD countries (see the QoG Institute’s web page). This 
addition was made in order to be able to study the relationships hands on among more 
developed and rich countries in comparison to less developed and poor countries. In the 
health literature, the degree of economic development is often included as an intervening or 
interacting variable ultimately affecting levels of population health. The hypothesis is that a 
better economy leads to better health for the population. The OECD versus Non-OECD 
classification of countries is used as a crude but useful and concrete proxy for the level of 
economic development and richness. 
 
The results are summarized in a set of tables in the Table Appendix. All QoG variables reveal 
strong and positive bivariate relationships with all five Health indicators. Here a positive 
relation indicates that more of a QoG variable is positively associated with higher levels of 
Life Expectancy, lower levels of Mortality Rates for Children and Mothers, higher levels of 
Healthy Life Expectancies and higher levels of Subjective Health feelings. The positive 
relationship with QoG is most pronounced for Healthy Life Expectancy and least noticeable 
for Subjective Health. 
 
In contrast to the strong relationships between the QoG variables and the Health indicators, 
the relationships between the Health Spending measures and population Health is rather weak 
most of the time and occasionally non-existent. The connection to Health levels is positive, 
but weak for Total Health Spending and Government Health Spending. However, for Private 
Health Spending as well as for Private Share of Total Health Spending, the relation to good 
Health is close to zero or slightly negative. A negative relation in this context means that 
                                                 
5 http://www.qog.pol.gu.se, - Working Paper 2009:16  
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more Private Health Spending (as a percentage of GDP) is coupled with lower Life 
Expectancy, higher Mortality Rates among Children and Mothers, lower Healthy Life 
Expectancies and lower Subjective Health assessments.  
 
Controlling for being an OECD or a Non-OECD country does not change any of the 
relationships. The QoG variables are all positively related to good Health among OECD as 
well as Non-OECD countries. However, if anything, the relationships are somewhat stronger 
among OECD countries. Not withstanding this, it is worth emphasizing that the connection 
between good Government and good Health is rather strong and positive among the less 
economically developed Non-OECD countries. Quality of Government matters for good 
Health among poor as well as rich countries. 
 
Even the relationships between Health Spending and levels of population Health stay the 
same after taking OECD membership into consideration. All correlations are weak if at all 
existing. But the relationship between Total Health Spending and good Health as well as the 
relation between Government Health Spending and good Health is positive among OECD and 
Non-OECD countries. For Private Health Spending there is no relation, or a negative one, 
with Health indicators like the Mortality Rate of Children under Five and Healthy Life 
Expectancy. Thus, money matters for good Health, but only to a limited extent. And 
preferably it should be public money, not private. 
 
Testing the results for overlapping or confounding effects in multivariate analyses further 
strengthens our conclusions. For example and as in Table 5, regressing a Health indicator 
(Healthy Life Expectancy) on a QoG variable (Government Effectiveness) and two Health 
Spending variables (Government as well as Private Expenditures on Health) underscores our 
previous finding that Quality of Government as well as Public Health Spending – independent 
of each other - is strongly and positively connected to high levels of population Health.6 
Private Expenditures on Health, however, is not associated with good Health. If there is any 
connection it tends to be negative, not positive.7  
                                                 
6 The results remain unchanged when we include interaction terms in the regression analyses. There are no 
significant interaction effects from Government Effectiveness and the Health Spending variables on levels of 
Healthy Life Expectancy. The independent linear effect of Government Effectiveness is the most important.  
7 We have run the regression test separately among OECD countries and Non-OECD countries. The QoG 
variable has a strong and significant positive effect on Healthy Life Expectancy in both analyses, among OECD 
and Non-OECD countries. Government Health Spending has also a positive effect in both cases, but among the 
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Consequently, the recommendation coming out of our study to improve Health levels around 
the world, in rich countries as well as in poor countries, is to improve the Quality of 
Government – corruption kills – and to finance health care with public, not private, money.      
 
Good Governing Matters 
 
As indicated above, there are many reasons for why variations in the level of Quality of 
Government should have an impact on population health. Some are what we have called the 
direct factors such as absenteeism of health personnel because they want to earn more money 
working illegally on the side. Demands of extra “under the table” fees may deter some of 
those that are in most need of health care to visit health clinics. Corruption in the procurement 
of contracts and the supply of pharmaceutical may be other such direct factors. However, as 
shown in the cases of safe water and policies that ameliorate the worst forms of inequality, 
there may also be strong indirect effects between QoG and population health. Our results so 
far are of course preliminary and need to be analyzed further using more control variables. 
For example, the HIV epidemic that has had devastating effects in large parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa may be related to factors that are very remotely, if at all, related to any of the QoG 
measures we have used in this analysis (Persson and Sjöstedt 2009).  Still we believe that as a 
first take, we have shown that studying this relationship is important. The finding that it is 
public and not private spending that has a positive effect on population health demands 
further investigations. One possible way for understanding this surprising effect may be the 
following.  According to new research by Krishna, what drives people into poverty in many 
developing countries (and also for the uninsured part of the population in the United States) is 
that they themselves, or someone in their family, are hit by an illness that requires extensive 
medical treatment (Krishna 2006). Lacking health insurance, the medical bills they have to 
pay becomes a financial burden of such a magnitude that they are driven into severe poverty, 
often because they have to sell land, cattle or other assets that they have used to accumulate 
income. The effect of the lack of publicly funded health insurance results in severe poverty 
for many which, in turn, may be the cause for why they a) are hit by the inequality-bad health 
effect that the social epidemiologists have analyzed or, that they simply will lack resources 
for even basic forms of preventive health care (Krishna 2007).  
                                                                                                                                                        
few OECD countries the regression coefficient is not significant. Private Health Spending has a not-significant 
but negative effect on good Health among OECD as well as Non-OECD countries.     
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Table 1. The Relationship Between Three Quality of Government Variables and Five 
Indicators of Health 
 
Rule of Law CPI 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Health Indicator R2 Relation R2 Relation R2 Relation 
Life Expectancy at Birth .38 pos. .28 pos. .38 pos. 
Mortality Rate Children <5 .38 pos. .26 pos. .38 pos. 
Maternal Mortality Rate .32 pos. .24 pos. .33 pos. 
Healthy Life Expectancy .47 pos. .38 pos. .47 pos. 
Subjective Health (WVS) .14 pos. .20 pos. .19 pos. 
 
Comment: A positive relation indicates that more of the QoG-variable is positively 
associated with higher levels of Life Expectancy, lower levels of Mortality Rates for Children 
and Mothers, higher levels of Healthy Life Expectancies and higher levels of feeling 
Subjectively Healthy. A negative relation indicates the opposite on all accounts. CPI stands 
for Corruption Perception Index. The data come from the QoG Institute Data Bank. All 
variables are specified in the Figure Section.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. The Relationship Between Four Measures of Health Spending and Five 
Indicators of Health 
 
Total Health 
Spending  
(% of GDP) 
Gov’t Spending 
on Health  
(% of GDP) 
Private Spending 
on Health  
(% of GDP) 
 Private Share of 
Total Health 
Spending (%) 
Health Indicator R2 Relation R2 Relation R2 Relation R2 Relation 
Life Expectancy 
at Birth .13 pos. .23 .pos .01 neg. .14 neg. 
Mortality Rate 
Children < 5 .14 pos. .20 .pos .00 neg. .13 neg. 
Maternal 
Mortality Rate .11 pos. .19 .pos .00 neg. .10 neg. 
Healthy Life 
Expectancy .16 pos. .23 .pos .01 neg. .14 neg. 
Subjective 
Health (WVS) .20 pos. .10 .pos .09 pos. .01 neg. 
 
 
Comment: See Table 1. A negative relation means that more private spending on health as a 
percentage of GDP or as a percentage of total health spending is associated with lower Life 
Expectancy, higher Mortality Rates among Children and Mothers, lower levels of Healthy 
Life Expectancy and lower levels of Subjective Health assessments.  
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Table 3. The Relationship Between Three Quality of Government Variables and Two 
Indicators of Health Levels Among OECD and Non-OECD countries. 
 
Corruption Perception Index 
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries 
Health Indicator R2 Relation R2 Relation 
Mortality Rate Children <5 .24 pos. .17 pos. 
Healthy Life Expectancy .49 pos. .13 pos. 
 
 
Government Effectiveness 
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries 
Health Indicator R2 Relation R2 Relation 
Mortality Rate Children <5 .37 pos. .34 pos. 
Healthy Life Expectancy .55 pos. .30 pos. 
 
 
Rule of Law 
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries 
Health Indicator R2 Relation R2 Relation 
Mortality Rate Children <5 .44 pos. .33 pos. 
Healthy Life Expectancy .55 pos. .30 pos. 
 
Comment: See Table 1. A positive relation indicates that more of the QoG-variable is 
positively related to higher levels of Healthy Life Expectancies and to lower levels of Child 
Mortality.  
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Table 4. The Relationship Between Three Measures of Spending on Health and Two 
Indicators of Health Levels Among OECD and Non-OECD Countries 
 
Total Health Spending (% of GDP) 
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries 
Health Indicator R2 Relation R2 Relation 
Mortality Rate Children <5 .06 pos. .08 pos. 
Healthy Life Expectancy .13 pos. .04 pos. 
 
Government Spending on Health (% of GDP) 
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries 
Health Indicator R2 Relation R2 Relation 
Mortality Rate Children <5 .19 pos. .12 pos. 
Healthy Life Expectancy .28 pos. .09 pos. 
 
Private Spending on Health (% of GDP) 
OECD Countries Non-OECD Countries 
Health Indicator R2 Relation R2 Relation 
Mortality Rate Children <5 .01 neg. .00 neg. 
Healthy Life Expectancy .00 neg. .01 neg. 
 
Comment: See Table 2. A positive relation indicates that more of the health spending 
variable is associated with higher levels of health. A negative relation means that more health 
spending is related to lower levels of health.  
 
 
Table 5. Regressing Healthy Life Expectancy on Government Effectiveness and 
Government and Private Expenditures on Health 
 
 Coefficient t-value 
Constant 54.3*** 30.1 
Government Effectiveness 6.60*** 9.6 
Government Expenditure on Health (% of GDP) 0.96*** 3.0 
Private Expenditure on Health (% of GDP) -0.10 -0.2 
Adj. R2 = .48 
 
Comment: The dependent variable (Healthy Life Expectancy) is measured in years. The 
Expenditure variables are measured as percent of GDP. The World Bank’s Government 
Effectiveness variable is standardized and varies in most cases between -2.5 (low 
effectiveness) and +2.5 (high effectiveness). 
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